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TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH EXPECTANCY OF INHERITANCE OR
GIFT – SUGGESTIONS FOR RESORT TO THE TORT

Irene D. Johnson *
I. Introduction **
The cause of action for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance or
gift, while not a new development, has received recent attention, 1 especially in light of
the substantial awards of compensatory and punitive damages in a California Bankruptcy
Court 2 and, on appeal, in the United States District Court for the Central District of

*

Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
For convenience, throughout this article, the term “testator” will be used to signify the decedent whose
estate is at issue, even if it eventuates that the decedent dies intestate, and the term “testamentary benefit”
will be used to signify benefits received from the testator’s probate estate, whether the benefits are provided
in a probated will or by intestate succession.
1
See, e.g., F. Ladson Boyle, Tortious Interference with an Inheritance, 2 PROB. PRAC. R. 1 (March 1990);
James A. Fassold, Tortious Interference With Expectancy of Inheritance: New Tort, New Traps, 36 ARIZ.
ATT’Y, Jan. 2000, at 26; Martin L. Fried, The Disappointed Heir: Going Beyond the Probate Process to
Remedy Wrongdoing or Rectify Mistake, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 357 (2004); Diane J. Klein, A
Disappointed Yankee in Connecticut (or Nearby) Probate Court: Tortious Interference with Expectation of
Inheritance - A Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the First, Second, and Third Circuits, 66 U.
PITT. L. REV. 235 (2004)(Klein III); Diane J. Klein, The Disappointed Heir’s Revenge, Southern Style:
Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance – A Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 79 (2003)(Klein II); Diane J. Klein, Revenge of the
Disappointed Heir: Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance – A Survey with Analysis of State
Approaches in the Fourth Circuit, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 259 (2002)(Klein I); Steven K. Mignogna, On the
Brink of Tortious Interference with Inheritance, 16 PROB. & PROP. 45 (2002); M. Read Moore, At the
Frontier of Probate Litigation: Intentional Interference With the Right to Inherit, 7 PROB. & PROP. 6
(1993); Dennis D. Reaves, Tortious Interference with an Expected Gift of Inheritance, 47 J. MO. B. 563
(1991); Curtis E. Shirley, Tortious Interference with an Expectancy, 41 RES GESTAE 16 (Oct. 1997);
Marianna R. Chaffin, Stealing the Family Farm: Tortious Interference with Inheritance, 14 S.J. AGRIC. L.
REV. 73 (2004); Paul F. Driscoll, Tortious Interference with the Expectancy of a Legacy: Harmon v.
Harmon, 32 ME. L. REV. 529 (1980); Nita Ledford, Note—Intentional Interference with Inheritance, 30
REAL PRO. PROB. & TR. J. 325 (1995-1996); Marilyn Marmai, Tortious Interference with Inheritance:
Primary Remedy or Last Recourse, 5 CONN. PROB. L.J. 295 (1991). Other recent articles dealing, in part,
with tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance or gift include Aloysius A. Leopold and Gerry W.
Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate: A Viable Alternative, 43 ARK. L. REV. 131 (1990); Mark. R. Siegel, Unduly
Influenced Trust Revocations, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 241 (2002). Earlier articles on the tort include Alvin E.
Evans, Torts to Expectancies in Decedents’ Estates, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1944-1945); Leo H. Whinery,
Tort Liability for Interference with Testamentary Expectancies in Decedent’s Estates, 19 U. KAN. CITY L.
REV. 78 (1950-1951).
2
Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550, 562-63 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000)(award to Vicki
Lynn Marshall of damages of $ 449,754,134, to be reduced by a possible probate recovery and “punitive
damages in an amount that remains to be determined after her actual damages are calculated”).
**

California, 3 in Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), to Vickie Lynn Marshall (better
known to most as Anna Nicole Smith) 4 in her action against her stepson, E. Pierce
Marshall, on the ground of tortious interference with her expectancy of an inter vivos gift
from her recently-deceased husband, J. Howard Marshall, II. 5 While Marshall is,
without doubt, the highest-profile case to involve a cause of action for tortious
interference with an expectancy, the tort has surfaced in many cases in many jurisdictions
over the past century. 6
The tort of tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance or gift provides
the means by which a plaintiff, who claims to have been deprived of an expected
inheritance, benefit under a will, at-death benefit, or inter vivos gift, by the tortious act of
the defendant, can recover for the loss of this expectancy. For example, A, who is not an
intestate heir of the testator, expects to receive a benefit under the testator’s will, which
has been drafted by the testator’s attorney, provides that the testator’s entire probate
estate is to go to A, but has not yet been executed. B, an intestate heir of the testator,
tortiously induces the testator to not execute the will favoring A (by fraud, duress, or
undue influence, for example, or, more dramatically, by physically preventing the testator
from executing the will). As a result, the testator dies intestate (at which point, of course,
he would not be a testator), B receives an intestate share, and A receives nothing. A is
understandably miffed by these events. He feels that he has been damaged by B’s
behavior; that but for B’s tortious acts, the will would have been executed and A would
have received the entire probate estate, the thing that he expected. No remedy would be
available to A in the probate court because A cannot prove up a will that has not been
properly executed. In many jurisdictions, however, A is not out of luck because he can
bring a civil action against B for B’s tortious interference with A’s expectancy.
Some would argue that providing A with a recovery against B for loss of an
expectancy is not warranted because A’s interest is “too shadowy and evanescent;” 7
there was never a guarantee, even if the testator had executed the will favoring A, that the
testator would have left that will in place and not changed his mind before his death.
Most courts and commentators agree, however, that A is recovering not for the loss of the
benefit under the will per se, but for his loss of the opportunity of receiving that benefit;
A is recovering for his right not to have his opportunity interfered with by B’s tortious
conduct. 8 A is like a pass-receiver in a football game. The quarterback (the testator)
throws the pass toward A, the intended receiver. Through pass-interference, B prevents
A from being in a position to receive the pass. There is no guarantee that A would have
caught the football, but B is penalized for depriving A of that opportunity.
In the above wills hypothetical, it is clear that the emphasis in a tort recovery is
the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; that the purpose of the tort relief
is to vindicate A’s rights not to have his opportunity interfered with. The focus of the
3

Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5, 58 (C.D. Cal. 2002)(award to Vicki Lynn Marshall of
“compensatory damages…of $ 44,292,767.33, plus costs of suit, plus punitive damages…of
$ 44,292,767.33”).
4
275 B.R. at 8.
5
For a discussion of Marshall, see infra notes 46 to 75 and accompanying text.
6
For a listing of cases decided before 1950, see Whinery, supra note 1, 79 n.7; for a listing including
recent cases, see Klein III, supra note 1, 240 n.10.
7
Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill 104, 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1845).
8
See, e.g., Klein I, supra note 1, at 264-65.

probate process is quite different. The purpose of probate is to identify the testator’s
intent in respect of his probate estate and insure, to the extent possible, that the testator’s
intent is being accomplished. 9 When a defendant tortiously interferes with an
expectancy, he is necessarily acting to interfere with the testator’s testamentary intent as
well as the plaintiff’s expectancy. In the tort, as demonstrated by the description of the
tort below, the focus is on what the defendant did (committed an intentional tort), how it
affected the plaintiff (prevented the plaintiff from receiving his expectancy), and what
damages the plaintiff suffered.
II. The Tort (and a Comparison to Probate)
In 1979, the Restatement Second provided the following statement of the tort of
intentional interference with expectancy: “One who by fraud, duress, or other tortious
means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or
gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the
inheritance or gift.” 10 A common statement of the elements that must be proved by the
plaintiff in order to recover is: “the existence of the expectancy; that the defendant
intentionally interfered with the expectancy; that the interference involved tortious
conduct such as fraud, duress, or undue influence; that there was a reasonable certainty
that the plaintiff would have received the expectancy but for the defendant’s interference;
and damages.” 11 If any of these elements is not established, the cause of action for
tortious interference with expectancy will not lie.
Again, the emphasis in probate proceedings is the effectuation of the testator’s
intent with respect to the disposition of the testator’s probate estate (something difficult
to establish with definiteness because the testator, at the point of probate, is necessarily
dead), while the thrust of the tort is to restore to the plaintiff the benefit of which he was
arguably deprived by the defendant’s tortious conduct. The result of a successful tort
action is a judgment against the defendant for money damages, not a determination of the
validity of a particular will or other testamentary result.
Although some of the considerations in a tort action will be the same as
considerations in a probate proceeding with respect to the same set of circumstances,
there are major differences between tort and probate in addition to the differing focus of
the proceedings, the testator’s intent as opposed to the plaintiff’s injury. A tort action
would be an in personam action by the plaintiff, the person allegedly deprived of his
expectancy by the tortious conduct of the defendant, against the alleged tortfeasor. 12 In
probate, even if there is a wills contest involving proponents and opponents of a
particular testamentary plan, the proceeding is in rem, to determine where the testator’s
probate property should go. 13 A tort action can result in a judgment against the
defendant, the alleged tortfeasor, to be paid from his personal assets. 14 A probate
9

Id. at 263-64.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979).
11
Sonja Soehnel, Annotation, Liability in Damages for Interference with Expected Inheritance or Gift, 22
A.L.R. 4TH 1229 (1983).
12
Klein I, supra note 1, at 265.
13
Id. at 260.
14
Moore, supra note 1, at 6.
10

proceeding will result in a determination as to what will happen to the assets in the
testator’s probate estate. 15
In tort, the parties pay their own costs and expenses, with the plaintiff often
recovering from the defendant for costs and expenses of litigation if the plaintiff is
successful in establishing tort liability. 16 Remedies in tort can include prejudgment
interest, attorney’s fees and punitive damages. 17 In probate, the cost of litigation to
defend the estate (comparable to the defendant’s costs in tort litigation) is borne by the
estate rather than by the proponents of the will. 18 When a determination is made in
probate, whether in favor of the proponent’s position or in favor of the opponent’s
position, the decision provides what is to happen to the estate’s property, and, even if the
opponent succeeds, there is no opportunity to obtain prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees
or punitive damages. In other words, in probate, in the many cases in which a will was
allegedly tainted in some way by tortious conduct and the proponent of the will would be
the alleged tortfeasor in a civil tort action, an unsuccessful defense of the will costs the
proponent nothing out of his own pocket and often results in his receipt, under another
prior will or by intestacy, of a substantial benefit.
An often-noted distinction between probate proceedings and tort actions is the
standard of proof. 19 Because of the nature of probate, determining the intention of a
person who, because of his death, is not in a position to testify, the standard of proof is
high. 20 In most jurisdictions, a will must be established by the testimony of two credible
disinterested witnesses. 21 On the other hand, in a tort action, the standard of proof is
simply a preponderance of the evidence. 22 It is possible that a will which could not be
proved up in probate because of some inadequacy of evidence could be established, for
purposes of tort, because of the lesser standard of proof. Technically, since the purpose
of the tort action might be to establish that the defendant tortiously interfered with the
plaintiff’s expectancy of inheritance by preventing, in some way, the will favoring the
plaintiff from being effective in probate, the purpose of “proving” the will in tort would
be simply to establish the interference, not to establish the will. 23 Some courts and
commentators, however, have expressed concern about these different standards of

15

WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 12.1 (3d ed. 2004).
See also Moore, supra note 1, at 6.
16
See Fried, supra note 1, n.11.
17
Id. at 359-60. In one case, a tort action was brought, subsequent to a successful outcome in probate, to
recover for compensatory and punitive damages not available in the probate proceeding. Huffey v. Lea,
491 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 19920.
18
Shirley, supra note 1, at 16. According to this commentator, “Normally, the estate pays both defense
attorney fees and those of a plaintiff making a good faith attempt to probate a prior will.” Id. See also
MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 15, § 12.1, at 498.
19
See, e.g., Fried, supra note 1, at 381-81; Klein I, supra note 1, at 270.
20
Klein I, supra note 1, at 260. Professor Klein notes, “[The probate] process is attended with special
formalities and high standards of proof, intended primarily to protect the testator, who of course cannot
testify personally (on account of being dead).” Id.
21
MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 15, § 4.3, at 189-92.
22
See Klein I, supra note 1, at 270.
23
See Moore, supra note 1, at 8.

proof. 24 At least one writer has suggested that potential conflicts could be avoided by
requiring the same standard of proof in tort actions as in probate proceedings. 25
Sometimes, a probate court proceeding is not even available to a person who
seeks to vindicate a right of expectancy of which he claims to have been tortiously
deprived. He might lack standing 26 to participate in a probate proceeding. 27 If, for
example, A claims to be a person who would have benefited under Will 1, a will that the
testator was tortiously prevented from executing, the testator instead having been
tortiously induced by B to execute Will 2, a will under which A does not benefit, and A is
not an intestate heir of the testator, in many jurisdictions A will not have standing to
participate in the probate proceeding because, even if Will 1 is defeated, the testator’s
property will pass by intestacy and A cannot claim a share by intestacy. Thus, A would
be barred from the probate proceeding because he lacked standing. In a tort action
against B to establish that B tortiously interfered with A’s expectancy under potential
Will 1, A, as plaintiff, would necessarily have standing.
The statute of limitations on tort actions is usually different from the statute in
probate proceedings. 28 Moreover, the statute often starts to run in tort not at the time of
the testator’s death but rather at the time the tortious conduct occurred or at the time
when the tortious conduct should have been discovered. 29 Other differences include the
availability of a jury in tort 30 and the possibility that the tort action could be brought in a
federal court. 31
Finally, some would argue that one of the purposes of tort law, and particularly of
the availability of a tort action for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance or
gift, is to penalize and deter tortious conduct. Commentators have noted that the probate
system has virtually no deterrent effect 32 while the possibility of being assessed not only
compensatory damages but also attorneys’ fees and, in appropriate cases, punitive
damages, in tort might deter potential tortfeasors.33
IIIA. Availability of the Tort in General

24

Klein I, supra note 1, at 267.
Fried, supra note 1, at 382.
26
“In order to discourage ‘strike’ suits by persons seeking to extract money by threatening costly
litigation, courts allow wills to be contested only by persons with a financial interest in the contest.”
MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 15, § 12.1, at 497.
27
Klein I, supra note 1, at 266-67.
28
Klein I, supra note 1, at 270.
29
Moore, supra note 1, at 8.
30
Shirley, supra note 1, at 20.
31
Klein I, supra note 1, at 265-66.
32
Klein I, supra note 1, at 266.
33
Id. at 267-68. For example, B who is not an intestate heir of the testator, fraudulently induces the
testator to execute a will which provides a substantial benefit for B and nothing for A, the testator’s
intestate heir and the person who would have taken had the tortious conduct not occurred. A opposes
probate of the fraudulently induced will and is successful. A takes by intestacy and B takes nothing. B has
lost nothing by his unsuccessfully engaging in tortious conduct. The estate paid to defend the will. No
damages were assessed against B, and B stood the chance of being successful in probate. Nothing that has
happened to B would deter him from trying again at another time. Moreover, the case would serve as a
message to others that they have nothing to lose by engaging in tortious behavior.
25

While not all jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for tortious interference
with expectancy of inheritance or gift, about half of all jurisdictions do permit actions
based on the tort. 34 Some jurisdictions have not ruled on the availability of the tort, 35
while other states appear to have rejected its use. 36 Of the jurisdictions recognizing the
tort, most take the position that a tort action will not lie unless it can be established that
probate is inadequate in some way—that probate would not provide a sufficient remedy
or that probate would not be available at all to the person claiming tortious deprivation of
his expectancy. 37 Some refer to this as an “exhaustion” requirement, that probate
remedies must be exhausted before recourse can be made to tort. For example, probate
would not provide any remedy for a person who lacked standing to get into probate court.
Nor would probate provide any remedy in a case like Marshall where the tortious
conduct of her stepson allegedly deprived Vickie Lynn Marshall of an expectancy in the
form of an inter vivos gift of non-probate assets. 38 Moreover, in the case where the
plaintiff claims to be a person who would have benefited had the testator not been
tortiously prevented from executing a will, probate will not provide the plaintiff with a
remedy because there is no will to probate. Just from these few examples, it is clear that
the tort fills a need for a remedy outside of probate.
In terms of the availability of the tort, the cases seem to fall into three categories.
First, there are those cases in which probate provides an adequate remedy and there
would be no need for the tort. 39 So any action would proceed in the probate court.
Second, there are those cases in which probate would provide an inadequate remedy or
no remedy, 40 so that the case should proceed in tort without resort to probate. Third,
however, are those cases in which a probate proceeding is held, the result does not
provide complete relief (or any relief) to the person alleging deprivation of an expectancy
by tortious interference, and a tort action is then sought. 41 It is this third category of cases
34

For a state-by-state enumeration and analysis of the acceptance of the tort action as a cause of action
available in civil courts of general jurisdiction, see Klein III, supra note 1, n.10.
35
Id.
36
Id. One commentator has claimed, “No case can be found in which a court has categorically denied a
plaintiff the right to proceed on a tort theory. Generally, the courts rely on other reasons to prevent relief
in tort, such as the ability to obtain the same result by contesting a will offered for probate.” Fried, supra
note 1, n.64.
37
One court has defined adequacy of probate remedy in the following manner: “Adequacy is predicated
on what the probate court can give as compared to what the plaintiff reasonably expected from the testator
prior to interference.” DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, n.11 (Fla. 1981), ans. conformed to 675 F.2d 670
(5th Cir. 1982).
38
For a discussion of Marshall, see infra notes 46 to 75 and accompanying text.
39
See, e.g., DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1981), ans. conformed to 675 F.2d 670 (5th Cir.
1982)(tort action would not lie where the plaintiffs had failed to attack the will in an earlier wills contest,
which attack would have afforded them complete relief); Estate of Hoover, 513 N.E.2d 991 (Ill. App.), app.
den. 517 N.E.2d 1086 (1987)(tort action would not lie where success in the plaintiffs wills contest would
result in complete relief); Smith v. Chatfield, 797 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. App. 1990)(action for tortious
interference would not lie where earlier wills contest provided complete remedy).
40
See, e.g., Neumann v. Wordock, 873 So. 2d 502 (Fla. App. 2004)(the plaintiffs, who would have had an
inadequate remedy in probate, could bring tort claim even though, because of lack of assets in the probate
estate, no probate action had been brought).
41
See, e.g., Estate of Jeziorski, 515 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. App. 1987), app. den. 522 N.E.2d 1245 (1988)(the
plaintiffs, who had pleaded two counts of tortious interference in their wills contest in the probate division,
were permitted, after the probate court dismissed their tort action and during the pendency of the probate
action, to proceed separately in tort in a civil proceeding because even if they were successful in the wills

(along with cases in which a tort action is sought without resort to probate and with no
showing that probate would not provide adequate relief) 42 that often raises the issue of
whether a tort action would be a barred as a collateral attack on the probate court
determination (or whether the action should be barred, by the collateral attack doctrine,
because appropriate resort to probate was not sought). 43
contest they would not get the relief they sought); Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 1992)(the
plaintiffs, upon successful completion of wills contest, were permitted to proceed in tort for compensatory
and punitive damages not available in the probate contest).
42
See, e.g., McGregor v. McGregor, 101 F. Supp. 848 (D. Colo. 1951), aff’d 201 F.2d 528 (10th Cir.
1953)(the plaintiffs, legatees under a later will than the one that was probated by the decedent’s widow,
were precluded from proceeding with a tort claim because they had not attempted to probate the will under
which they claimed a benefit); Hall v. Hall, 100 A. 441 (Conn. 1917)(the plaintiff-heir, who had not asked
the trial court as a court of equity to treat probate decree of validity of will attacked in tort action as
inoperative, could not proceed with tort action); Holt v. Holt, 61 S.E.2d 448 (N.C. 1950)(the plaintiffsheirs, who had not had a paper writing that was probated as decedent’s will declared invalid as a
testamentary writing, could not maintain their actions in tort).
43
An early commentator on the tort noted:
An initial proposition is that only probate courts have jurisdiction to probate wills and
that a probate decree, like other judgments and decrees, is not subject to collateral attack.
There is a disposition also on the part of courts to hold that if a claimant has an adequate
remedy in probate court, he should not first resort to a court of general jurisdiction.”
Evans, supra note 1, at 188. A more recent commentator expanded on this position:
A court faced with a lawsuit brought by a disappointed heir for damages…should
determine initially whether the matter is one within the province of a probate court. If the
claimed wrongdoing relates to the execution or revocation of a will, and the claimant has
standing in the probate proceeding, the court should not entertain an independent action
even if the jurisdiction recognizes the tort of interference with an inheritance. Thus,
when a delay in pressing a claim in the probate court was avoidable, the claimant cannot
relitigate issues cognizable in the probate court or collaterally attack the probate decree.
A plaintiff who had an opportunity to contest the validity of a will and chose not to do so
also should be precluded from maintaining an independent action once the probate
proceeding is over. The bottom line is that an interference action in a court of general
jurisdiction should be allowed only when a probate remedy is inadequate or unavailable.
Fried, supra note 1, at 371-72 (footnotes omitted). As to cases like Huffey, supra note 41, Professor Fried
suggests:
Some courts find that success in the probate court does not bar a separate action for
tortious interference with an inheritance. These courts advance the theory that a party’s
claim of undue influence in the probate proceeding focuses on the testator’s intent, while
the independent action focuses on the tortious means intentionally used by the alleged
wrongdoer in depriving the claimant of an inheritance or gift. Therefore, these courts say
the later actions are neither claim- nor issue-precluded because they are not the same
action and do not use the same evidence.
Fried, supra note 1, at 373. One recent commentator has gone even farther:
The cause of action for tortious interference with inheritance does not constitute a
collateral attack on the decree of the probate court….A judgment is not res judicata in a
subsequent proceeding unless the matter adjudicated in that proceeding is identical to the
matter at issue in the subsequent proceeding. In the tort action, the plaintiff is not
attacking the validity of a will of record or attempting to probate a document that he
alleges is a valid will. Nor is he seeking to recover from the estate. Rather, the plaintiff
is bringing an action against the person or persons whose malevolence prevented him
from receiving a legacy. Since the action may provide relief regardless of the probate
decree, the plaintiff does not attempt to retry the issues adjudicated by the probate court
or to attack the decree of that court. Therefore, an independent suit in tort undertaken as

IIIB. Availability of the Tort – An Analysis
Several commentators have written on the subject of this tort, 44 including one
writer who has undertaken an ambitious jurisdiction by jurisdiction survey of the
availability of the tort. 45 It is the purpose of this article to identify and categorize, in this
fact-driven area, those several different circumstances in which the tort might be relevant
and then to suggest, in respect of each circumstance, a rational approach to the
availability of the tort. While some cases and circumstances will remain problematic
after this analysis, this writer’s purpose is to classify, clarify and rationalize, to the extent
possible, those different situations in which the tort might be implicated.
1. Expectancy to Receive an Inter Vivos Gift Reduced or Defeated by Tortious
Interference with the Gift
As noted above, 46 the Restatement Second includes, in the statement of the tort,
the situation in which the plaintiff-claimant’s expectancy to receive an inter vivos gift is
interfered with in a tortious way. While cases abounded in which the plaintiff alleged
deprivation of an expected at-death benefit such as insurance proceeds 47 or the remainder
interest of a revocable inter vivos trust, 48 before the Marshall 49 case, few, if any, cases
involved deprivation of a true inter vivos gift. 50 Probably, the fact that, with respect to
most inter vivos gifts, the expectant-donor is still alive would mean that these situations
could be resolved by actions on the donor’s part. In Marshall, 51 the expectant-donor died
shortly after promising the gift, so the tort issue was raised. 52

a primary cause of action to remedy interference with inheritance does not offend the
principle of res judicata.
Marmai, supra note 1, at 313.
44
See supra note 1.
45
See Klein I, Klein II, and Klein III, supra note 1.
46
See supra, text at note 10.
47
See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
48
See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
49
See infra notes 53 to 75 and accompanying text.
50
The writer of the most recent A.L.R. annotation on tortious interference, see Soehnel, supra note 11, at
§ 10, found only two cases prior to Marshall that involved gifts taking effect before death, Ross v. Wright,
190 N.E. 514 (Mass 1934), and Simar v. Canaday, 53 N.Y. 298 (1873). In each, the defendant prevailed.
51
See infra notes 53 to 75 and accompanying text.
52
275 B.R. at 20-25.

Briefly, the relevant facts follow. 53 J. Howard Marshall, II, a wealthy Texan in
his late eighties, married Vickie Lynn Marshall, a woman substantially younger than
himself. As part of their more than two year courtship, J. Howard made lavish gifts to
Vickie and frequently promised her that, if they married, he would give her, as an inter
vivos gift, a substantial amount, referred to by the District Court for the Central District
of California as half of their “new community.” 54 He made this promise in front of
others 55 and undertook to accomplish this goal by directing his attorneys to create a
“catch-all” trust for Vickie with this property.56 J. Howard’s son from a prior marriage,
E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce), in conjunction with one of J. Howard’s attorneys,
successfully blocked this gift. According to one court in this action, Pierce and the
attorney committed many intentional acts to prevent the gift from being accomplished,
all acts described by the court as “tortious conduct.” 57
Vickie’s claim for intentional interference with the expectancy of a gift arose in
the context of a bankruptcy proceeding brought by Vickie in California. 58 In that
proceeding, Pierce filed a proof of claim against Vickie alleging that she had defamed
him by certain statements that she made to the press and alleging that such claim would
not be dischargeable in the bankruptcy. 59 Vickie counterclaimed against Pierce for
tortious interference with her expectancy of a gift. 60 The Bankruptcy Court, finding that
these claims and counterclaims were “core proceedings” over which it had the authority
to enter a final judgment, found that Pierce had committed the tort and assessed
compensatory damages of almost $450,000,000. 61 Upon review of the Bankruptcy
Court’s determination, the District Court found that Vickie’s claim was not a “core
issue,” and, therefore, that the Bankruptcy Court’s determination was a proposal rather
than a final judgment. 62 The District Court, in a de novo review, agreed with the
Bankruptcy Court’s finding that Pierce had tortiously interfered with Vickie’s expectancy
53

While for purposes of this article, the relevant opinions regarding the tort of tortious interference with
the expectancy of inheritance or gift are those of the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of
California, Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550 (2000), and the United States District Court
for the Central District of California, Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5 (2002), the case
involved a subsequent reversal of the District Court by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Marshall
v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118 (2004), on the ground that the “probate exception” would bar
federal jurisdiction in this case because the estate of J. Howard Marshall, II, was being probated in a Texas
court, and a United States Supreme Court reversal and remand of the Ninth Circuit decision, Marshall v.
Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), on the ground that the probate exception did not bar jurisdiction in this
case, “that the District Court properly asserted jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim against Pierce [for
totious interference].” 547 U.S. at 314. The Supreme Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit to address the
question of “whether Vickie’s tort claim was ‘core,’” 547 U.S. at 297, for purposes of the jurisdiction of
the District Court and other procedural issues. Id. Reference will be made to the Supreme Court opinion,
not for the issue of the “probate exception” which is beyond the scope of this Article, but for clarifications
of facts and issues regarding the tort claim.
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275 B.R. at 52. According to the Court, “[t]his term was defined by J. Howard as one-half of the growth
of his assets during the time of their marriage.” Id.
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Id. at 26.
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Id. at 53.
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547 U.S. at 293. The Bankruptcy Court filing is In re Marshall (Chapter11)(Bankr. C.D. Cal 1996).
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Id.
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Id.
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253 B.R at 562-563.
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547 U.S. at 294.

of a gift from her husband, J. Howard, II. 63 Basing its damage assessment on a different
valuation method from that used by the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court gave Vickie
a little over $44,000,000 in compensatory damages and an equal amount in punitive
damages. 64
In its determination that Pierce had tortiously interfered with Vickie’s expectancy
of a gift, the District Court applied Texas law (the domicile of J. Howard Marshall, II),
finding that Texas has adopted the Restatement Second position on this tort. 65 The court
stated the elements of the cause of action – “[a] plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of
an expectancy; (2) a reasonable certainty that the expectancy would have been realized
but for the interference; (3) intentional interference with that expectancy; (4) tortious
conduct involved with the interference; and (5) damages” 66 – and then applied these
elements to the proof in the case. The court found the existence of an expectancy in the
facts that J. Howard made “numerous promises to Vickie that she would receive half of
what he owned,” 67 which promises were consistent with his past behavior in another
relationship and were witnessed, in at least one case, by one of his attorneys, and that he
sought, on several occasions and through various methods, to have his attorneys
accomplish this goal. 68 In Vickie’s evidence regarding the expected gift and in evidence
of Pierce’s tortious conduct in respect of the gift, the court also found reasonable
certainty that the gift would have been realized had it not been for Pierce’s conduct. 69
Ample proof demonstrated the intentionality of the tortious acts of Pierce and one of J.
Howard’s attorneys. 70 Moreover, many pages of the opinion are devoted to the evidence
of Pierce’s tortious conduct. 71 According to the court, “Evidence of Pierce’s tortious
conduct is legion. Acting in concert with [the attorney], they backdated documents,
altered documents, destroyed documents, suborned falsified notary statements, presented
documents to J. Howard under false pretenses, and committed perjury.” 72 As the final
element of the tort, the court considered and assessed damages,73 as described above.
The tort analysis in this case is very straightforward. Moreover, the type of facts
presented here, deprivation of expectancy of inter vivos gift, suggest only one forum for
relief for Vickie – the civil court in a tort action. 74 J. Howard’s probate estate, which was
essentially without assets, 75 had nothing to do with the gift that Vickie had been
promised, and thus, no probate proceeding could have provided Vickie with a remedy. It
is clear that in a case involving tortious interference with the expectancy of an inter vivos
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275 B.R. at 58.
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Id. at 51. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Id. citing Doughty v. Morris, 871 P.2d 380 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
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Id. at 51-52.
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Id. at 53.
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Id. at 36-50.
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Id. at 53.
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Id. at 53-38.
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In this case, there is no forum which would focus on the intent of J. Howard Marshall, II in not having
his intended inter vivos gift blocked by the behavior of others. If he were still alive and learned of this
tortious frustration of his intent, he could take action himself to accomplish his goals.
75
275 B.R. at 13-19.
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gift, the tort should be available in any jurisdiction as the only possible method for doing
justice.
2. Expectancy to Receive an “At-Death” Benefit Reduced or Defeated by
Tortiously Induced Alteration of the Benefit
Another “gift” category of cases in which the tort would provide the primary, if
not sole, method for relief would be in situations involving “at-death” benefits that are
not part of a decedent’s probate estate. For example, A is a beneficiary under a revocable
inter vivos trust which provides: “Income to the settlor for life. Remainder to A.” Thus,
A is to succeed to the corpus of the trust at the settlor’s death. The trust corpus is not part
of the settlor’s probate estate. Before the settlor’s death, B, through the intentional tort of
undue influence, causes the settlor to change the remainder beneficiary of the trust from
A to B. Arguably, B’s intentionally tortious conduct deprived A of the expected benefit
of the remainder of the trust. 76 Other examples of non-probate, at-death benefits would
include being a joint tenant with a right of survivorship on real property or personal
property, 77 being a designated beneficiary on a life insurance policy, 78 or being the
beneficiary of a payable-at-death certificate. 79 In any of those arrangements, the person
expecting to receive the at-death benefit might be deprived of that expectancy by the
tortious conduct of another who convinces the joint owner or insured or depositor or
settler to remove the expectant person from the designation.
These cases would again be candidates for treatment in tort. Since the assets at
issue are not probate property, the probate process would not be relevant unless, because
of the interference, this property became probate property at the time of the testator’s
death.
3. Expectancy to Receive a Testamentary Benefit Reduced or Defeated by
Tortiously Induced Inter Vivos Diminution of the Testator’s Probate Estate
A third category of cases involve situations in which claimants are deprived of an
inheritance because of the tortious inducement of an inter vivos transfer of assets that
76

Cases involving intentional interference with revocable trusts include Davison v. Feuerhard, 391 So. 2d
799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)(case involving the allegation that the appellees tortiously prevented the
settlor of an inter vivos trust from signing an amendment that would have named the appellant as trust
remainder beneficiary; the appellate court recognized a tortious interference action based on the appellant’s
expectation of being a beneficiary of a revocable inter vivos trust noting that “with regard to tortious
interference claims, no real distinction exists between gifts of inheritance through will and gifts through a
new trust”, id. at 802); Hammons v. Eisert, 745 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)(case involving the
allegation of undue influence in the revocation of an inter vivos trust to the detriment of the trust
beneficiary; the court held that “the beneficiary of a revocable…trust has a cause of action…against a
person who, by the exercise of undue influence induces a settler to revoke the trust and thereby
diverts…the trust funds and prevents the beneficiary from receiving that which he otherwise would have
received”, id. at 254.).
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See, e.g., Doughty v. Morris, 871 P.2d 380 (N.M. 1994)(the tortiously induced transfer of joint bank
account and joint certificate of deposit from names of mother and daughter to names of mother and son).
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See, e.g., Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 425 N.E.2d 1187 (Ill. App. 1981); Monroe v. Biggs, 139 P. 422 (Kan.
1914); Daugherty v. Daugherty, 154 S.W. 9 (Ky. 1913).
79
See Mitchell v. Langley, 85 S.E. 1050 (Ga. 1915).

otherwise would have passed to the claimant under a will or by intestate succession. 80 In
other words, the interference is not with the probate dispositions per se but with the assets
with which those dispositions could have been paid. For example, A is the sole
beneficiary under the testator’s valid and effective will which was properly executed in
1995. Subsequent to the execution of the will but prior to the testator’s death, B
tortiously induces the testator to make substantial inter vivos gifts to B (or to someone
else who is not A), 81 which gifts have the effect of substantially or completely depleting
the testator’s probate estate. At the testator’s death, the testamentary disposition to A
remains in place, but there is little or no probate property available for the disposition
because of B’s tortious diversion of these assets during the testator’s lifetime.
In the above hypothetical, probating the will would establish A’s entitlement to
take as the beneficiary of the will. 82 The probate process, however, will not restore to A
that of which he claims to have been deprived by B’s tortious acts – the potential probate
property transferred inter vivos, thereby depleting the amount that A will receive under
the will. Probate would not provide A with a remedy for A’s loss caused by B’s tort, so
this would be a case in which A should be allowed to bring a civil action against B for
tortious interference with A’s expectancy of inheritance. 83 In this type of case, no one
could argue that the civil action would be a collateral attack on any probate proceeding
which established the will. The focus would be on B’s conduct in draining the probate
estate through tortious behavior, with a successful action resulting in a judgment against
B to be paid from B’s personal assets, the source of which need not be the former probate
property, not on any determination made in the probate process. The will would be
established and the civil action would not question the establishment of the will.
4. Expectancy to Receive a Testamentary Benefit Reduced or Defeated by
Tortious Inducement to Execute, Not Execute, Revoke or Not Revoke a Will
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See, e.g., Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013 (Me. 1979)(the plaintiffs, who alleged that the defendants had
committed a tort by convincing the ailing testator to convey to them certain property that otherwise would
have been part of the probate estate in which the plaintiffs would share, were found to have stated a cause
of action in tort); Peralta v. Peralta, 131 P.3d 81 (N. M. App. 2005)(the plaintiff, whose brother and sister
(the defendants) allegedly, through tortious conduct, arranged to have their mother convert otherwise
probate property into non-probate dispositions for the benefit of the defendants (and through other tortious
acts affected the plaintiff’s expectation of inheritance), thereby depriving the plaintiff of an expected
inheritance, were found to have stated a cause of action in tort).
81
It does not appear necessary, for the tort of tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance or gift to
be established, that the property that the plaintiff expected but did not get was diverted to the defendant by
the defendant’s tortious conduct. The only requirement in this regard is that the expected gift or inheritance
be diverted from the plaintiff by the defendant’s tortious actions.
82
In this case, the establishment of the will would also establish A’s expectancy. Although there is
always the argument that the testator, before his death, could have changed his mind and disposed of these
assets in another manner, one which was not the product of tortious conduct on B’s part, the “but for”
analysis is very strong here – the testator took all steps necessary for certain assets to go to A. But for B’s
interference, those assets would still be part of the testator’s probate estate and pass to A under the will.
83
The argument can be made that a tort action would not be necessary in this type of case because the
representative of the estate could take action to recover the diverted assets. Cf. Shirley, supra note 1, at 16.
Even if this is a viable alternative to a tort action, it would not provide an adequate remedy in those cases
(probably most cases) in which the defendant or other recipient of the inter vivos dispositions has
consumed the property, making recovery of it by the representative impossible.

A category of cases which includes several sub-categories, dependent on the
specific facts of the case, are those cases in which a testator is tortiously induced to
execute or not to execute a particular will or is tortiously induced to revoke or not to
revoke a particular will. The first-mentioned sub-category, tortious inducement to
execute a will, might involve the following facts: the testator, who had not planned to
execute a will and, therefore, would have died intestate, thereby benefiting his intestate
heirs, including A, is tortiously induced by B to execute a will which benefits B but does
not benefit A. If the will is admitted to probate, B’s tortious conduct will have deprived
A of the opportunity to receive an intestate share of the testator’s estate. 84 This example
would clearly come within the parameters of the tort, but would come within the group of
cases in which A, the potential tort plaintiff, could get relief in a probate proceeding. 85
As an intestate heir, A would have standing to oppose the admission to probate of the
questioned will. And if A can establish, in the probate proceeding, that the will was the
product of the tort of undue influence, for example, the will would be defeated and A
would take his expected intestate share. 86 This would seem to be a case in which resort to
probate, the court to which has been delegated the primary responsibility for determining
the validity of wills, should be required before any resort to a tort remedy in civil court
could be pursued. An unsuccessful result in probate – that the will is admitted because
A’s claim of undue influence could not be proved – should also then be the end of A’s
options. Allowing A to then try to establish the tort would allow a collateral attack on the
probate court’s determination of the validity of the will. 87
An issue which remains open in respect of the above example in which A is
successful at probate is the question whether a tort action would then lie in which A
would claim as damages punitive damages (available in tort but not in probate),
attorney’s fees from the probate action (not available in probate), and other consequential
84

It is not necessary that B benefit from his tortious conduct in order for A to have a cause of action for
tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance. So long as B has tortiously interfered and A has been
deprived of his expectancy by the tortious conduct, A should be able to recover for the tort (assuming the
jurisdiction recognizes the tort and any threshold requirement, such as exhaustion of probate remedies, has
been satisfied), even if the tortiously induced Will does not benefit B at all. The relevant question is B’s
actions vis-à-vis A’s expectancy and not to whom that expectancy is diverted.
85
Whether such relief would be “complete” is a matter in dispute among courts recognizing the tort. At
least one court has permitted a tort action subsequent to a successful wills contest, with the claims in the
tort action being for attorney’s fees, punitive damages, and economic losses caused by the plaintiff’s
inability to pursue his living (farming) during the pendancy of the probate proceeding. Huffey v. Lea, 491
N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 1992). See also King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App. 1987)(subsequent to a
probate determination that the decedent had not signed a power of attorney pursuant to which the
decedent’s wife assigned the decedent’s stock to herself, on review of a jury award of actual and exemplary
damages in a tort action brought by the decedent’s children , the court reduced the amount of actual
damages and affirmed the rest of the jury award). Such recovery would not be available in the probate
proceeding. Other courts have denied tort relief in similar circumstances, noting that punitive damages and
the like are not part of a claimant’s “expectations.” See, e.g., DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1981)
ans. conformed to 675 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1982). In a footnote, the court stated, “For purposes of adequacy
of relief we do not consider punitive damages as a valid expectation.” Id, at 220 n.11.
.
86
MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 15, § 7.3.
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For a discussion of the issue of collateral attack in the context of actions for tortious interference with
inheritance, see supra note 43. To this writer, in this case, such a tort action would be giving B a second
shot to establish the undue influence, and in a context in which the standard of proof would be reduced to a
simple preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the tort action should not be permitted.

damages. Decisions in this area are split, with some courts permitting the subsequent
action on the ground that probate did not provide A with “complete relief” because such
damages are not available in probate, 88 while others view the probate success as the end
of the process because A had no expectancy in these damages. 89
Changing the above hypothetical example, what if B is an intestate heir of the
testator and the testator intends to execute a will favoring A, who is not an intestate heir
of the testator? Moreover, the testator has taken steps to accomplish this execution by
consulting his attorney and having the proposed will drawn up. The only necessary act
left undone (a big one) is the execution of the will by the testator. B, through tortious
conduct, prevents the testator from executing the will. As it stands, the testator died
intestate, which would benefit B but certainly not help A. And probate would not
necessarily provide a complete remedy for A. First, A does not have standing to get into
the probate court. He cannot offer for probate the unexecuted will and so he would have
nothing to gain by opposing intestacy. Clearly, he cannot get relief in probate. This
would be a situation in which a civil law action by A against B on the tort would be the
action of first resort. A could recover as damages from B, personally, the amount that A
expected to receive under the will, had B not tortiously interfered with its execution.
Arguably, an action in equity seeking a constructive trust would also be a possibility, 90
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See supra note 85.
Id. The situation in which B tortiously induces the testator to execute will can arise in other fact
situations, discussed below, which involve a combination of tortiously induced execution with tortiously
induced revocation of another will under which the claimant would have benefited.
90
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy. MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 15, § 6.1, at 269. When
title to property is found in the hands of a person who, but for wrongdoing, would not have title, a
constructive trust can be impressed which makes the wrongdoer/titleholder into a trustee for the benefit of
those who would have taken had the wrongful conduct not occurred. In the words of Justice Cardozo:
A constructive trust is a formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression.
When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title
may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a
trustee.
Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919). As stated by another
commentator, “A constructive trust arises when the titleholder of property is subject to an equitable duty to
convey it to someone else, on the ground that permitting the titleholder to retain the property would result
in unjust enrichment.” MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 2.1.1 (5th ed. 2006). The
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 184 (1937) provides: “Where a disposition of property by will or an
intestacy is procured by fraud, duress or undue influence, the person acquiring the property holds it upon a
constructive trust, unless adequate relief can otherwise be given in a probate court.” So, for example,
where the decedent, on her deathbed, was prevented by some of her heirs-at-law from executing a will
which would have benefited her friend (who was not an intestate heir), the heirs-at-law, who took from
decedent’s estate by intestacy, were found to be constructive trustees for the friend, who would have taken
had the wrongful conduct not occurred. Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1948). The probate court
could not provide adequate relief because the will desired by the decedent had not been executed. In
another case, Latham v. Father Divine, 85 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1949), the court found that a constructive
trust would be available as a remedy where the plaintiffs alleged that defendant, a beneficiary under the
decedent’s will, prevented the decedent, by murder, from revoking that will and executing a new will in
favor of the plaintiffs, individuals who were not intestate heirs of the decedent. Again, the probate court
could not do justice by refusing to admit the tainted defendant-favoring will to probate because an intestacy
(not what was desired by the decedent) would result. The Comments and Illustrations to the Restatement
of Restitution § 184 provide many more examples of situations in which probate could not remedy a
situation that had been caused by fraud, duress or undue influence.
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but would not provide A with relief if, for example, during the pendency of the litigation,
the estate assets were spent by B. 91
A simple example of a fact situation involving tortious inducement of the testator
to not revoke a will would be the following: the testator intends to revoke his will by
physical act and die intestate. B, who benefits under the will, prevents the testator, by
duress and fraud, from revoking the will. A, an intestate heir of the testator, who would
have taken an intestate share of the testator’s probate estate had B not engaged in the
tortious behavior, is understandably disappointed. A probate remedy for A in this
situation is less likely than in that provided above. When B offers the will for probate the
will looks fine on its face and has been properly executed. There is no direct evidence
from the will of any attempt at revocation. In fact, there was no actual attempt to revoke.
A has standing to oppose the admission of the will to probate because if the will is
defeated A will take by intestacy. But what argument would A make that the will should
not be admitted to probate? B’s tortious conduct did not induce the testator to undertake
some action such as execution of a will. Even though A can get into the probate court, at
least in theory, the contest would be questionable since the will itself was not the product
of duress and fraud. Perhaps a probate court would stretch the facts by finding that the
will itself was procured by fraud and duress since but for the tortious conduct which
prevented the will from being revoked the will could not have been offered for probate.
If the will is admitted to probate, a fraud claim could serve as the basis for the impressing
of a constructive trust. A civil action in tort, however, would give A the relief that he
seeks. If A can prove that B tortiously frustrated the testator’s attempt to revoke the will,
thereby depriving A of the benefit of his intestate share, A could recover the amount of
that share as damages from B. And this would be the result whether B benefited under
the will or simply interfered with A’s expectancy because of some malicious desire to
injure A. Arguably, this would not be a collateral attack on the will because the court
would simply be finding that B caused A damages by B’s tortious conduct, a matter
involving different issues and proof than the question of whether the will had been
effectively revoked.
The last example to explore of those cases that involve a single tortious induction
to execute, not execute, revoke, or not revoke – without another related act of execution
or revocation – would be where the testator is tortiously induced to revoke a will and
thereby die intestate. In this case B could be an intestate heir of the testator who
tortiously induces the testator to revoke the will by physical act, which will was to benefit
A, not B. A, as a beneficiary under a revoked will, would have standing to offer a copy
The Restatement of Restitution provides a constructive trust as an equitable remedy in non-probate
situations as well: “Where a person acquires property from another by fraud, duress or undue influence
under such circumstances that a third person is entitled to restitution from the transferee, the transferee
holds the property upon a constructive trust for the third person.” RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 169
(1937).
91
See Siegel, supra note 1, at 264. In the conclusion to his article, Professor Siegel states, “In situations
where the constructive trust cannot restore the status quo, a tortious interference action may be warranted.
For example, to the extent the trust property were consumed or otherwise dissipated or wasted, a tort action
would be necessary to make the trust beneficiaries whole.” In his article, entitled Unduly Influenced Trust
Revocations, Professor Siegel was writing specifically about revocable inter vivos trusts, but his reasoning
would extend to any situation in which a constructive trust would be used to recapture assets diverted from
their intended recipient through wrongful conduct.

of the will for probate, just like in the case of a lost will. 92 A could argue that the will
was not revoked because the testator did not have the requisite intent to revoke based on
the tortious induction of the testator to revoke. If A can prove the tortious conduct,
thereby rebutting the presumption of revocation by physical act, A could offer a copy of
the will for probate. If, however, A could not prove the will because of difficulties of
proof caused by physical destruction of the will, it would seem only fair to permit A to
bring a tortious interference claim against B. Probate would not have given A complete
relief, and, but for B’s tortious conduct the will could have been proved in probate.
More complex scenarios involve tortious inducement, in the same case, to execute
one will and revoke another, or to revoke one will which would revive another, or to
choose to execute one will rather than another. For example, the testator has executed
Will 1, which will benefits A. By undue influence, B tortiously induces the testator to
execute Will 2, which will revokes Will 1 (a tortiously induced revocation) and which
will does not benefit A but benefits B instead. When B offers Will 2 for probate, A has
standing to oppose the admission to probate of Will 2 because A is a beneficiary under
Will 1, and, if Will 2 is defeated, Will 1 would be reinstated. The probate process here
would seem to provide A with a complete remedy (putting aside the question of
attorney’s fees, punitive damages, and the like). If A establishes that Will 2 is the
product of undue influence, Will 2 will fail and Will 1 will be reinstated, restoring to A
the fruits of his expectancy, his inheritance under Will 1. A should be required to
proceed in probate and oppose Will 2 rather than simply bringing a tort action in civil
court against B; A should be required to exhaust his probate remedies. And if A is
unsuccessful in probate – Will 2 is not defeated because the undue influence cannot be
established – then A should not be able to have another opportunity to establish the undue
influence in a civil action in tort where the standard of proof is lower than in probate.
Another such situation would involve the following: the testator has executed
Will 1, which will does not benefit A. The testator intends to execute Will 2, which will
would revoke Will 1 and benefit A. B tortiously induces the testator to fail to execute
Will 2, a tortious inducement of a failure to execute (Will 2) and a failure to revoke
(Will 1). A, who is not an intestate heir, cannot get appropriate relief in probate. He
does not have standing to oppose the admission to probate of Will 1 because, if Will 1 is
defeated the testator’s probate estate will pass by intestate succession and A would not
benefit. Moreover, he cannot offer Will 2 for probate since it was never properly
executed. As in a couple of examples given above, a remedy might be available in equity
92

According to MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 15, § 5.2, at 241, “Normally when a will cannot be
found and the fact-finder…determines that it was not revoked, a copy of the will is probated or other proof
is used to establish its contents.” The New York statute on proof of lost or destroyed wills, N.Y. SURR. CT.
PROC. ACT § 1407 (McKinney 1995), provides:
A lost or destroyed will may be admitted to probate only if
1.

It is established that the will has not been revoked, and

2.

Execution of the will is proved in the manner required for the probate of an existing will, and

3.

All of the provisions of the will are clearly and distinctly proved by each of at least two

credible witnesses or by a copy or draft of the will proved to be true and complete.

through a constructive trust, 93 and at least one commentator has suggested that both
probate and equity should be exhausted before resort is made to the civil courts and the
cause of action for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance or gift. 94 As noted
above, a problem with the equitable relief would arise if, subsequent to the setting up in
probate of Will 1 and prior to the equitable remedy of a constructive trust, the probate
estate assets were spent. 95 Then no constructive trust would be available. Moreover, if
Will 1 did not benefit B (which is possible) but benefited C instead, the constructive trust
would make C a constructive trustee for A’s benefit even though C did no wrong. A
recovery in tort, however, would require that B pay damages to A from B’s resources as
remediation for B’s tortious conduct. The tort relief would seem to be desirable because
B would be made legally responsible for his act of depriving A of A’s expectancy under
Will 2 rather than making the estate assets answerable through the medium of C.
The same sort of analysis would apply in the following case: the testator intends
to execute Will 1, which would benefit A. B tortiously induces Testator to execute
instead Will 2, which would not benefit A. Again, unless A is an intestate heir, A would
not have standing to oppose the admission to probate of Will 2. Moreover, A could not
offer Will 1 for probate because Will 1 was never properly executed. Here the probate
process would not offer A relief, but the tort would. This would be a clear case for the
tort.
5. Expectancy to Receive a Testamentary Benefit Reduced or Defeated by
Tortious Suppression or Spoliation of a Will
The final category of cases to be considered for use of the tort are those in which
the tortious conduct is the suppression or spoliation of a will. The testator properly
executes a will, which benefits A. B, an intestate heir of the testator, conceals or destroys
the will. If A is aware of the original existence of the will, A could try to have the will
admitted to probate. A would have to rebut the presumption that the testator revoked the
will by physical act; 96 then A would have to prove due execution and the contents of the
will. 97 Perhaps, however, due execution cannot be established because of the fact that the
proof of execution was destroyed along with the will. In these cases, A should be able to
seek a remedy in tort. The tortious act of B is what caused the failure of proof in probate.
As stated by one commentator, “[I]t is possible that the proof which would be inadequate
to probate such a will, might be sufficient to support a judgment in a tort action….” 98
IV. Conclusion
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See supra note 90.
Siegel, supra note 1, at 255-63 (section entitled “Proposed Redress for the Wrongful Interference
Scenario: Available Relief in Probate or Trust Proceedings in lieu of Tort Action”).
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See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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From the above discussion, it is clear that there are some circumstances in which
the tort of tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance or gift would be the only
method for remedying such wrongful interference. In the case of the deprivation of an
inter vivos gift, as in Marshall, probate would have nothing to do with the issue. The
same would be true for situations in which the interference is with nonprobate at-death
benefits. If A expects a benefit under a revocable inter vivos trust and B tortiously
induces the settlor to revoke the trust, A’s remedy would be in tort. Moreover, in cases
involving inter vivos depletion, through a tortfeasor’s conduct, of a testator’s probate
estate, which depletion deprives a beneficiary or heir of an expected inheritance, again
the remedy would be in tort. The tortious conduct has not interfered with anything in
which the probate court would have an interest (a will or intestacy), but only with the
amount available in the probate estate.
In some cases involving a direct interference with a testator’s testamentary intent,
the person injured by the conduct could get relief in probate. For example, the intestate
heir who can oppose a will that testator was tortiously induced to execute would have
probate relief available. The claimant would have standing in probate and defeat of the
will can give the claimant the benefit he expected (although he won’t recover punitive
damages and attorney’s fees without a trip to civil court, if such is permitted in his
jurisdiction). In these cases, probate should be exhausted before any resort to civil court.
In other cases involving a direct interference with a testator’s testamentary intent,
probate will not be a viable option, either because the claimant lacks standing to seek a
remedy in the probate forum or because the probate court will not be able to give
complete relief (if, for example, the will has been suppressed or destroyed by the
tortfeasor and cannot be proved up in probate court). In those cases, the tort remedy
should be available because of the importance of righting the wrong caused by the tort.

